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‘Gender’ in the aftermath of Politics of Piety
SîanMelvill Hawthorne
Da’wa, SabaMahmood tells us, is ‘a Quranic concept asso-
ciated primarily with God’s call to the prophets and to hu-
manity to believe in the“true religion”, Islam’. It ‘literally
means “call, invitation, appeal, or summons”’.1 Whilst
cognisant of the uncompromising specificity of the de-
mand it places on those to whom the call is addressed, I
want in this short response to take up the concept as a
spur to ask what Mahmood’s work may summon, invite,
call us to do in the aftermath of Politics of Piety. What
praxis does it incite?
Beyond the myriad of responses generated by Politics
of Piety – some appalled at its apparent cultural relativ-
ism, adamant in their refusal to countenance the idea
that critique may arrive one fine day from beyond the
pale (or veil) of a globalised if not universalised white
secular liberalism,2 others more attuned or ambivalent3
– what I do not want to do here is to rehearse the well-
worn line that poses piety as an alternative model for
thinking through agency against the limitations posed
by the liberal frame of resistance or collusion. Rather,my
intent is to gesture, in general terms, to the metatheor-
etical implications for feminist praxis and conceptuality
of Mahmood’s call to see beyond the frameworks of secu-
lar liberalism and the commitments these engender and
constrain. More specifically I want to suggest that we
should attend to the historicality of ‘gender’4 and its con-
stitution within the logics of secular modernity which
are also and always colonial and racist. Thus my focus
here is on the extent to which, following in the wake of
Mahmood’s provocative invitation to recognise the eth-
nocentric limits of ‘the feminist subject’ within secular
liberal thought, we might begin the work of examining
the assumptions that underwrite ‘gender’ as a historical,
political, and thus provincial category.
The subtext of such a metatheoretical argument
pushes me to extend the critique Mahmood ranges
against the impoverished concept of agency that pro-
ceeds from a liberal sensibility, in order to ask whether
we may need to subject ‘gender’ to an assessment of its
parochial origins such that its various political articula-
tions can be shown to be as embedded in the constraining
imaginary of liberalism as ‘agency’ may be. And further,
and by implication, to question whether ‘gender’ is trans-
latable, by which I mean to ask, is it universalisable and
if so, in whose terms?
Of course, in a brief response such as this, it is
not possible to undertake what would be a necessarily
lengthy and detailed cataloguing of the ways in which
‘gender’ is tied to the liberal imaginary of secularmodern-
ity. Rather, my intention here is to indicate the broader
epistemological problematic and opportunity that fem-
inism is left with in the wake of Mahmood’s invitation to
attend to the mediation of conceptual and political his-
tories in the construction of foundational premises. This
concern with the role of conceptual mediation across
different social milieux runs through Mahmood’s text,
stated from the outset as a question:
If we recognize that the desire for freedom from, or sub-
version of, norms is not an innate desire thatmotivates all
beings at all times, but is also profoundlymediated by cul-
tural and historical conditions, then the question arises:
how do we analyze operations of power that construct
different kinds of bodies, knowledges, and subjectivities
whose trajectories do not follow the entelechy of liberat-
ory politics?5
Given the process by which ‘gender’ emerges as a cat-
egory constitutive of secularmodernity and its ostensible
alignment with liberatory politics via feminism may it
not also need to be subjected to an assessment of that
which mediates it and which it mediates?
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Translations
What if ‘gender’ is untranslatable?6 The issue of
(un)translatability, of the movement of a concept from
here to there, of themeanings that travel and thosewhich
do not, of the histories that remain in place and those
which are displaced, is one that Mahmood’s work also
addresses. Is ‘gender’ translatable? What is it that such
a question asks? Is it a question of correspondence? A
gesture towards the relationship between a universal-
ised genus and a range of differentiated species? If we
pose ‘gender’ in such terms we might suggest that it is
the genus – all cultures have a means of categorising
humans into one, two or several genders – in relation-
ship to which the various different cultures or societies
structure some variant or other of what is recognisable
as a gender system. But what does such a circularity
reference? What precisely is this original genus that
engenders these variations which nonetheless all share
something in common? In what does this commonality
lie and whence? What is it that we – and who this ’we’ is,
is the question – think we see when we look out into the
world and see the genus translated into species? Is there
translation without coloniality?
Although Mahmood only briefly raises the question
of (conceptual) translation and its connection to assump-
tions of universalisability,7 particularly theways inwhich
concepts’ histories may be marked by a certain intractab-
ility if not incommensurability that restricts their trans-
versal mobility, it seems that such a question under-
lies her call to understand agency otherwise, to extend
its lexical range beyond that which has been imagined
within secular liberalism. That is, she summons us to see
how translation out of the set of liberal commitments to
autonomy, liberty, choice, and so on, into a social and
political context with a different set of priorities and
concepts of a subject who acts intentionally, inevitably
constrains, distorts and conceals. Thus, the persistence
of assertions of similitude masks a will to universalise
which is always a colonial move. As Butler notes, in a
passage that Mahmood cites approvingly,
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no assertion of universality takes place apart from a cul-
tural norm, and, given the array of contesting norms that
constitute the international field, no assertion can be
made without at once requiring a cultural translation.
Without translation, the very concept of universality can-
not cross the linguistic borders it claims, in principle, to
be able to cross. Or we might put it another way: without
translation, the only way the assertion of universality
can cross a border is through colonial and expansionist
logic.8
So, when ‘gender’ as produced within (white) liberal fem-
inist thought travels, what does it reference? What polit-
ical and ideological commitments and histories does it
connect to and imply? What histories are neglected or
forgotten? Might we need to begin (again) to speak of
the ‘coloniality of gender’9 in order to speak of it at all?
Genealogies
By way of seeing how ‘gender’ may be caught up in a
history that limits its capacity to account for social ar-
rangements beyond the purview of its provincial origins,
the parallel case of ‘religion’ can prove instructive. In
the last twenty-five years, scholars have drawn attention
to how the taxon ‘religion’ is closely tied to the (opaque)
ethnocentric creation of public/private, secular/religious,
religion/state dichotomies that underpin and sustain the
project of European modernity and the nation-state, and
are further inevitably embedded in forms of colonialist
governmentality, both of which render the continuing
use of ‘religion’ as a category of knowledge or descriptor
for anything other than western Protestant Christianity
deeply suspect.10 Scholars have pointed to the ways in
which Religious Studies has traded in a series of rhetor-
ical techniques (for example, claims to the uniqueness,
universality, irreducibility, etc. of the datum ‘religion’),
that obscures the manufactured nature of its central cat-
egory, and moreover demonstrates the myriad ways in
which this work of manufacture, and indeed translation,
is to a large degree implicated in, supportive of, and
served by colonial conceptuality and its universalising
logic.
What this scholarship has established, further, is how
the contemporary common-sense notion of religion’s
universality obscures the history of its production and its
subsequent violent inscription qua translation on to cul-
tural practices, traditions and conceptual schemas quite
alien to the specificity of its European provenance. The
translation of non-western traditions and worldviews as
‘religions’ interpellated them into a highly provincial-
ised debate that not only restricted their possible modes
of articulation and signification but also predetermined
their reception and dissemination. Thus to use the term
‘religion’ to refer to non-European lifeways is to subject
them to a conceptual regime that always already implies
their inferiority and mistakenly assumes a shared refer-
entiality, that of the agonistic dichotomisation of the
religious and the secular realms characteristic of post-
Enlightenment European history. Europe’s struggles to
overcome ‘religion’ were struggles to overcome a particu-
lar form of Christianity but at the same time Christianity
was the primogenitive model for those traditions we now
understand as religious.
If the genealogy I point to here has by now been well
rehearsed within Religious Studies, a parallel effort in
white feminism11 regarding the history of ‘gender’ as a
critical category tied to secular liberal and colonial mod-
ernity (and the line between these two is paper thin), such
that the conceptual scope of ‘gender’ is tempered, has
yet to be undertaken in any systematic manner. Whilst
this is not the place to undertake such work,12 what we
might simply note here is what such a task may involve.
It would involve tracing the various strands of thought,
histories, politics and practices that have informed and
produced ‘gender’ as a category of analysis and critique,
as a site of identity, a process of meaning-making (and
imposition) and political organising. In tracking this his-
tory what would be shown is how these strands enact
racial and colonial politics and exclusions even in their
most benevolent figurations. It would imply attending
to ‘gender’s’ production in several intersecting contexts,
namely secular modernity’s segregation of women from
the bourgeois public sphere alongside the rise of the
nation state and the heteronormative nuclear family;
Enlightenment discourses of sovereignty and their re-
lationship to the ‘self’, that is, the ‘man of reason’; the
legislative connection forged between ownership of prop-
erty and the basis of citizenry; the liberal emphasis on
‘equality, liberty and community’ as the markers of tol-
eration and inclusion and which serve as the organising
itinerary of early and contemporary feminist thought;
European colonialisms, where ‘gender’, like ‘religion’,
was wielded as a civilising tool and a point of contrast
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to the European metropole; and the rise of race ‘science’
and the slave trade. Each of these contexts should, I
would argue, be read not only as the history of the con-
ceptual emergence of ‘gender’, but also as those in which
the conceptualisation of ‘gender’, whether as a sign of
negativity or positivity, operated as a technology of anti-
blackness inasmuch as racist anxieties and imaginaries
underwrote not only theorisations of both the content
and form of ‘gender’, but also enabled the prioritisation
of a privileged, deracinated gender imaginary which was
and is able to neglect race and coloniality as central to
its construction.
This neglect enables the persistent universalisation
of ‘gender’ as a tool in the pursuit of emancipation –
providing both its form and content (all the while com-
pliant with the chimeric quality of liberal government-
ality),13 and enabling the assumption that ‘gender’ has
some privileged, thus necessarily segregated, role to play
in the dismantling of patriarchy. There are at least five
dominant tendencies that, I have argued,14 signal the
neglect of the racist and colonialist underpinnings of
‘gender,’ which play out in contemporary white feminism,
and which point to the necessity for reconfiguration of
its priorities, institutional practices and structures, and
organising categories. Briefly, these are: (1) the tendency
to employ an ethnocentric model of ‘gender’ parading
as universal but which is informed by predominantly
western liberal feminist assumptions and political agen-
das, and which at the same time selectively appropriates
non-western traditions and practices in its service; (2)
a propensity to conflate feminist, black, womanist, post-
and decolonial feminist interests and experiences as sim-
ilar if not the same, and to treat misogyny, colonialism,
slavery and racism as analogous forms of oppression; (3)
relatedly, the habit of predominantly addressing ques-
tions of race, ethnicity and colonial histories when con-
sidering non-white populations and practices such that
whiteness disappears as a significant frame for all and any
sociality it nonetheless structures and informs; (4) the
adoption and distortion of ‘intersectionality’ as a mode
of transactional analysis that presupposes an unquali-
fied, unmarked subject to whom identity markers accrue
and which are interchangeable or brought into play at
different times and in different contexts. Such a move
fails to reference its origins in Black feminist thought and
thus to understand intersectionality as both an analytic
and lived experience of oppression and inequality within
matrices of power that persistently cross-cut, one which
indicts white feminism as one such matrix; (5) the tend-
ency to attribute to ‘religion’ and religious allegiance
the status of cause of oppression rather than source of
solidarity and nourishment, if not emancipatory insight.
To insist on the similitude of oppression across a
spectrum of difference whilst prioritising gender as the
tie that binds, is to indulge in a form of discursive imper-
ialism that not only weakens the intellectual credibility
and political force of feminist work, but also obscures
the embeddedness of much feminist thought in white
privilege and its persistent, if apparently unwitting, col-
laboration with racist and colonialist practices of exclu-
sion and universalisation, all in the name of freedom,
equality and sisterhood. Moreover, it suggests that an
invisibly etiolated feminism is adequate to the task of
thinking andwriting about, or better listening to, hearing
and centring material and persons wholly or partially dif-
ferent historically, philosophically or geographically.15
Gayatri Spivak’s assessment of a broader problem for
white feminism, echoing Mahmood’s own critique, is per-
tinent here when she draws attention to how it glosses a
significant problem when it attempts to embrace ‘multi-
culturalist or postcolonialmarginality’ in the articulation
of its mission: ‘that a concern with women and men who
have not written in the same cultural inscription (a work-
ing hypothesis that works well in colonial situations)
cannot be mobilised in the same way as the investigation
of gendering in one’s own’.16 The lesson here is that the
conceptual terrain – the categories, histories, methods,
and assumptions – of white feminism’s conceptualisa-
tion of ‘gender’ and its indebtedness and allegiance to
secular liberalism is so ethnocentrically specific that its
extension beyond that specificity to co-opt the values,
practices and histories of others in the service of its polit-
ical itineraries should be approached very warily.
Mahmood shows well how such a dynamic operates
with regard to the vexed question of women’s agency.
Demands for women’s autonomy and voice, and recogni-
tion of even their religious agency have animated much
feminist scholarship. More often than not – and this is
where Mahmood’s challenge to ‘the feminist subject’ and
the subject of feminism rings so true – feminist engage-
mentwith notions of agency and voice has rubbed against
‘traditionalist’ understandings of women’s piety where
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women are then framed as either passive and compliant,
or resistant and rebellious. Consonant with the secu-
larising imaginary of the liberalist political structures
of western states, agency is thus advanced as an appro-
priate response and form of resistance to the assumed
or mandated passivity of the religious woman. Failure
to exert agency as resistance or to exercise one’s voice
autonomously is routinely read as a failure of the willing
subject, a sign of the improperly formed political sub-
ject and of her retrogressive subjugation to patriarchal
structures of power. But to impose such a frame is silen-
cing and imperialist. Saba Mahmood thus warns against
the feminist scholarly co-optation of women’s agency
in support of ‘the goals of progressive politics’ because
it obscures those ‘dimensions of human action whose
ethical and political status does not map onto the logic
of repression and resistance’.17
Calls
What has made it possible for white feminism to fail to
see race and postcoloniality as the place from which con-
figurations of centre and periphery must be rethought
and even overturned? Part of the answer lies in the col-
lective failure of white feminism to attend to the eth-
nocentrism of the field’s history such that ‘gender’ is
prioritised as the site of origination for critique (because
it is assumed in the liberal feminist tradition to be the
site of origination for the self), rather than the historical
facticity of colonialisms, racisms, enslavement and their
afterlives. ‘Gender’ rendered as a singularly central form-
ation is claimed as both the place of enunciation and
as providing the content and analytic framing for that
enunciation. It appears to be unimplicated in colonial
and racist value codings and the theorisations of embodi-
ment, agency, voice and place, etc. that these assume and
invite. These colonial and racist histories have formed
the present, for all of us, however differentiated our re-
lations to those histories might be and it thus remains
a place from which the necessity or even possibility of
the translation of ‘gender’ and its foregrounding must be
tested.
The Indian feminist Uma Narayan, addressing the
agonistic encounters between western and non-western
feminists, has argued that ‘Working together to develop
a rich feminist account of this [colonial] history that di-
vides and connects us might well provide Western and
Third-World feminists [with] some difficult but inter-
esting common ground, and be a project that is cru-
cial and central to any truly “international” feminist
politics’. Narayan here implies that ‘western’ efforts of
self-definition are also therefore profoundly ‘political
responses to this history’.18
Might we not then read the prioritisation of ‘gender’
within feminist thought as precisely embedded in the
neo-imperialist politics of secular liberalism that of ne-
cessity invokes a temporally and spatially differential –
hierarchical – relation to a series of Others? Must we
not try to see how this differential relationship is then
(mis)represented as analogous to many forms of mar-
ginality, where ‘gender’ is nonetheless a first amongst
equals? Is this not a collusion with the structures of co-
loniality and racism that insist on, indeed require, the
simultaneous homogeneity and non-universalisability of
the apparent periphery? When we fail to account for and
to the colonial and racist history that is in fact the place
of common ground for all feminists, is white feminism
in particular not indulging in a project of self-definition
that repeats the colonial appropriation of the other in or-
der to accrue social and intellectual capital? If we were to
take seriously the vexed specificity of white colonial and
racist conceptuality as a significant part of the making of
‘gender’ as a site of critique, might it be that ‘gender’ will
no longer be the site where all the usual intersections
‘intersect’?
The most pressing question which I think Mahmood,
albeit obliquely, invites us to pursue, is why it is that
white feminism has not started from the place of the
other withwhom it asserts political and intellectual solid-
arity, from the ‘history that divides and connects us’, and
from the forms of sociality, belonging and responsibil-
ity that are other to its imaginary. Mahmood’s call, the
da’wa, with which we began, all the more poignant in the
aftermath of her death, invites us to begin again with a
work of translation, that now may fracture the certain-
ties of the secular liberal monopolisation of ‘freedom’:
‘[W]e can no longer arrogantly assume that secular forms
of life and secularism’s progressive formulations neces-
sarily exhaust ways of living meaningfully and richly in
this world.’19 The call is to move beyond the constrained
commitments of the secular, liberal modern, recall its
long history of withholding the promise of freedom, and
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seek those ways of living meaningfully that are not cap-
tured by its paradoxes. Responding to such a call is, must
become, a feminist praxis.
Sîan Hawthorne is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Religion
at SOAS University of London. Her research interests lie in
the areas of religion and gender, intellectual history in the
study of religions and its intersections with post- and decolo-
nial thought.
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